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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY &
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

v.
NEAL W. FINLAYSON^ individually
and LEE CHILDS, individually
and as Guardian ad litem of
MICHELLE CHILDS, a minor,

No. 860204 - CA
Before Judge Orme,
Bench and Billings

Defendant and
Appellant.
APPELLANT CHILDS' ANSWER TO RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN'S
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ANTHONY M. THURBER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Childs
Suite 735 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 533-0181
LOWELL V. SMITH, ESQ.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Metropolitan
Property & Liability
Insurance Company
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-7611

||>A^J •k'*7*i
nf j|V>£>^«A v#
lift**

APR

71988

COURT o r APr

<•**
<*

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY &
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

No. 860204 - CA

v.
NEAL W. FINLAYSON, individually
and LEE CHILDS, individually
and as Guardian ad litem of
MICHELLE CHILDS, a minor,

Before Judge Orme,
Bench and Billings

Defendant and
Appellant.
APPELLANT CHILDS1 ANSWER TO RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County
the Honorable David B. Dee, District Judge, Presiding
ANTHONY M. THURBER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Childs
Suite 735 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 533-0181
LOWELL V. SMITH, ESQ.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Metropolitan
Property & Liability
Insurance Company
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-7611

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY &
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

:
:
:
:
:

APPELLANT CHILDS1 ANSWER
TO RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN1!
PETITION FOR REHEARING

J

V.

No. 860204 - CA
NEAL W. FINLAYSON, individually
and LEE CHILDS, individually
and as Guardian ad litem of
MICHELLE CHILDS, a minor,

:
;
s

Defendant and
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Appellant Childs submits the following Answer and
Memorandum in response to respondent Metropolitan's Petition for
Rehearing, pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1.

Respondent Metropolitan in its Petition for

Rehearing argues that this Court has overlooked or misapprehended
a "number of issues" critical to the appeal.
The Court's opinion addresses the differing plausible
interpretations of the undefined policy term "regular use", and
concludes that the term as utilized in the policy is ambiguous.
The opinion did not address other issues for the obvious reason
that it was not necessary to do so once an ambiguity was found to

exist.
Appellants prosecuted this appeal from the lower court's
ruling, and specified on appeal the issue presented for
resolution.,

An appellant is free to designate the issue or

issues to be considered on appeal, and did so in this case.

The

appellants' designation presents a single issue, which appears at
page 2 of their brief:
The legal meaning of the undefined policy
provision "regular use" is the issue for
consideration on appeal.
The question
presented is whether the District Court
erred in determining as a matter of law
that
the
accident
vehicle
was
one
"available" for the insureds "regular
use" under the stipulated facts, the
policy terms, and applicable decisional
law. (emphasis added)
This Court was faced with only two possible resolutions
of the single issue presented by the appeal, which were:
1. To determine that the term "regular use" was not
ambiguous; and if so, whether the lower court's judgment
was supported by substantial evidence.
2. To determine that the term "regular use" was
ambiguous; and if so, reverse the lower court's
judgment.
Since under the stipulated facts this Court has found
the policy term "regular use" to be ambiguous, it is not
necessary for this Court to then apply the appellants' suggested
definition of the term in order to determine whether or not the
exclusion applies.

The policy term "regular use" was found to be

ambiguous for the reason that the opposing definitions urged b£
each of the parties were equally plausible interpretations; one
of which preserved and the other of which defeated coverage.
Construction against the creator of an ambiguity is a basic

requirement of the law; as is a construction of ambiguous policy
language which favors rather than defeats insurance coverage.
Construing the ambiguity against its creator and in favor of
coverage in this case mandates the action which the Court has
taken.
2.

Metropolitan argues that this Court has adopted a

definition of the term "regular use" in line with appellants1
suggested "pattern of use" test.

A plain reading of the opinion

discloses that the tests suggested by both parties were
considered and found to be equally plausible interpretations;
meaning that the term has more than one different meaning.

This

Court has not "adopted" appellants1 suggested definition of the
term, but has only found there to be an ambiguity which must be
resolved against its creator.
3.

Metropolitan argues that the policy itself

incorporates a "frequency" test rather than a "pattern of use"
test because of the "temporary substitute automobile" provision
contained within the non-owned automobile coverage exclusion.
The policy nowhere utilizes the term "frequent" or
"frequently"; and does not inform the reader just what the term
"regular use" means, either in the "furnished" or "available"
contexts.

The "temporary substitute automobile" language deals

only with a substitute automobile; which means one that is
utilized in place of the described vehicle.

It does not impart

clear meaning to the term "regular use".
4.

Metropolitan argues that public policy behind the

exclusion is not fostered by the adoption of a "pattern of use"

test.
As discussed above, this Court's opinion does not adopt
a "pattern of use" test, or for that matter any other "test"; but
simply concludes that there is an ambiguity in the policy
language which must be resolved against its creator.
Metropolitan's argument is deficient in failing to recognize that
the exclusion does in fact apply where a non-owned automobile is
being use within the scope of the purpose for which it was
provided to the insured.

There is under the Court's opinion no

"free" coverage created for such use.

The "drive other cars"

coverage is designed to provide coverage where the use being made
of the vehicle at the time of a given accident is not within the
scope of the purpose for which it was provided; and under
circumstances where the insured would ordinarily be driving his
own vehicle, for which he had paid a premium.

There is in

actuality no additional or "free" coverage created under the
Court's ruling, since the reason the insured would be utilizing
his own vehicle for the drinking activities if he did not happen
to be operating the employer's pickup.

Metropolitan's exposure

would be the same in either event.
5.

Metropolitan argues that this Court failed to

consider the "business use" exclusion of the policy.
From the stipulated facts, Mr. Finlayson's use of the
FINCO pickup could not by any stretch of the imagination be
considered a "business use" at the time the accident occurred.
This Court clearly addresses that point at page 3 of the opinion:
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Since the truck was furnished to Neal
Finlayson for the use in the course of
his employment, i.e., answering calls for
and performing mechanical repairs, his
use of the truck to go to and from the
"Animal House" bar was outside the
course,
especially
in
view
of
the
limitations expressly put on his use of
the truck by FINCO. (emphasis added)
It is significant that the policy insuring FINCO's
pickup did not insure only its "business use".

There has been no

suggestion, stipulation, or judicial finding there was any
"business use" involved.

The stipulated facts and this Court's

conclusion are to the contrary,
6.

Metropolitan argues that this Court did not consider

or address the fact that the truck was "available" to Neal
Finlayson for the use to which it was being put at the time of
the accident.
The stipulated facts are that the accident vehicle was
not "furnished" or "available" to Neal Finlayson for drinking
excursions to the Animal House or elsewhere which were unrelated
to his employment.

As this Court has observed, the undefined

policy term "regular use" could plausibly mean what either party
contends.

The ambiguity is obvious, and its existence in and of

itself resolves the only issue presented by this appeal.
7.

Metropolitan argues that this Court did not consider

the "potential" use for which the employer had made the truck
available, which potential use might conceivably include the
unauthorized drinking excursion to the Animal House.
If the accident had occurred during the course and scope
of Neal Finlayson's employment activities, there would be no

coverage and no problem.

The fact is it did not.

The

"potential" for an unauthorized use does not make the truck into
a vehicle "furnished" or "available" for such unauthorized use.
If the "potential" for such use were to be determinitive, the
policy could and should have said so, and it did not.
Ironically, Metropolitan's argument itself illustrates the
ambiguity of the undefined policy term "regular use".
8.

Metropolitan argues that the "use" to which the

truck was being put at the time of the accident was the same as
it had been on numerous other occasions; i.e., taking Mr.
Finlayson home, and that this Court should consider its use for
that purpose at the time of the accident to be a part of its
"regular use".
The stipulated facts include the parties1 agreement that
the accident vehicle had never been used to facilitate a drinking
excursion as it was on the accident date; either in driving to or
from the drinking place.

The stipulated facts are that the

employer's permission did not cover such use.

The fortuitous

fact that the Finlayson brothers were headed home after departing
from the course of their employment on

a Bacchanalian lark at

the Animal House does not return them to the course or scope of
their employer's business.

They had abandoned the employer's

business when they decided to take the rest of the day off and
drink.

Under the stipulated facts, their use of the accident

vehicle cannot possibly be considered a "business use" as urged
by the appellant.

9.

Metropolitan argues that this Court did not address

the public policy supporting the "drive other cars" exclusion.
Public policy considerations are not relevant where
there are other adequate legal bases for a court.-:' opinion.
finding of an ambiguity alone obviates any nee -

The

address public

po11cy conb iderati ons,
10.

Metropolitan argues that this Court did not

consider the internal language of tne

-xr'wi^i-*

^ich it claims

supports the contention that there is no ambiguity.
This Court's opinion addresses the arguments and
authorities of both parties and the i nternal language of the
policy

li is the policy language itself which creates the

ambiguity.

There is nothing more to consider in the way of

policy language than that *MH h h.r "><- i presents] i » \ "
considered by the Court,
11.

Metropolitan argues that this Court did not address

the fact that the FINCO can" ier had ptc:?"1 nously acknowledged the
accident to be one covered by its insurance policy.
The FINCO policy is not at issue in this litigation; and
the payment of any sums by way of settlement thereunder has no
relevance whatever to the issue of this appeal.

Respondent's

argument implies that payment under the FINCO policy establishes
that the accident arose from a "business use" of the accident
vehicle by Neal Finlayson.

Such an implication is unwarranted.

The FINCO policy does not insure only business use of the
described vehicle.
uses.

It insures other and even non consensual

The FINCO carrier could not have escaped liability, and

its payment proves nothing.
Any payment under the FINCO policy must of course must
be credited against any verdict in appellant's wrongful death
action; but that is its only effect.

Full or partial payment

under another policy, by another carrier, in behalf of another
insured has no relevance whatever to the issue raised by this
appeal.
12.

Metropolitan argues that there are a number of

"other issues" beyond the issue of whether Neal Finlayson's use
of the FINCO pickup constituted "regular use" within the meaning
of the policy.
All of the "other" issues raised by respondent in its
petition are secondary to that of the ambiguity which the court
has found to exist, and are rendered meaningless by that
finding.

The presence of the ambiguity in and of itself mandates

this Court's decision; without regard to the various opposing but
plausible interpretations of the ambiguous policy term.

There is

simply no need to go further.
13.

Metropolitan argues that the "mere" finding of an

ambiguity is not dispositve.
Under the stipulated facts, the ambiguous language leads
to different and equally plausible results, one supporting and
the other defeating coverage.

The Court and the parties are

legally bound to that interpretation which favors coverage.

Once

an ambiguity has been found, there is nothing more to consider.
14.

Metropolitan argues that since state law requires

the approval of policy forms by the Commissioner of Insurance,

the insurance contract forms are not "unilaterally drafted" by
insurance companies and "imposed upon an unsuspecting public".
While it is true that policy forms innst be filed with
ami approved by the Insurance Department before their sale to the
public, there is no provision in trie Insurance Code (Title 31)
which precludes an insurer from infv r r .>r _> t i nq ,,i precise
definition of policy terms which would reduce or eliminate
ambiguity.

The insurance Department would never reject a more

precise definition of any policy term.
Metropolitan argues that further inquiry into
"intent" is required by the Court to determine what effect a
particular "definition" may have

•.

'••••X\--,L"

of the

exclusion.
As indicated, the facts are stipulated.

There was no

"negotiation" with respect tu Mv* meaning of the policy term
"regular use"; and the term in its policy context is ambiguous.
The parties1 "intent" (if any) is irrelvant.
16.

Metropolitan

;jes that the policy exclusion does

not pertain to a particular use at a particular time, and that
the "regular use" exclusion should be broadly interpreted to
include the "furnished" or "available" concepts; regardless of
the particular use to which the vehicle is being put at the time
of a given accident.
The weakness of this argument is that the terms utilized
could be read, and have been read by other courts, both as
covering and as not covering a particular unauthorized use. It is
that possibility of opposing but equally plausible
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interpretations which creates the ambiguity.
17.

Metropolitan argues that the exclusion's terms

incorporate by implication a "frequency" test which this Court
should consider to remove the ambiguity.

Respondent argues that

use of the terms "other than a temporary substitute automobile"
in the excLusion incorporates a "frequency" test which must be
applied to the undefined term "regular use".
The policy nowhere utilizes the term "frequent" or
"frequently".

The policy does utilize the term "regular use" in

a context which makes it ambiguous under certain factual
circumstances such as that to which the parties have
stipulated.

A "temporary substitute automobile" may or may not

be one furnished for "regular use".

Under the stipulated facts,

it is entirely plausible that the accident vehicle might be
considered as a "temporary substitute automobile" and therefore
covered by definition; since it was being used in place of Neal
Finlayson's own automobile to facilitate the drinking
activities.

Metropolitan's use of the term "temporary substitute

automobile" as an exception to the exclusion does not constitute
a policy specification of a "frequency" test or render the term
"regular use" any less ambiguous.

If anything, the policy's

assurance of coverage for a non-owned "temporary substitute
automobile" reinforces the argument that coverage should be
extended under the present facts; since the accident vehicle was
being used as a temporary substitute for the insured's own.
It should be noted that the divergent opinions of other
courts which are cited in this court's opinion all involved

policies which contained "temporary substitute automobile"
provisions that failed to produce uniform interpretations.

The

ambiguity persists regardless of the "temporary substitute
automobile" provision.
18.

Metropolitan argues that if the vehicle is

"furnished" or "available" for the regular use of the insured
(whether actually used or not), it is not a "non-owned
automobile" according to the policy definition.
If the vehicle is not used, there is of course no
problem.

The purpose of insurance is to cover accidents, which

ordinarily occur only while a vehicle is being used.

If it _i£

used, one should be able to determine by reading the policy terms
what use is covered and what is not.

Metropolitan's policy

language fails to inform the reader with any degree of certainty
what is meant by the term "regular use".

The insured cannot tell

by reading the policy whether he is covered or not.

The fact

that the courts themselves have reached opposing interpretations
is significant, since judges are generally more capable of
reading and understanding contracts than laymen.
19.

Metropolitan argues against coverage because Mr.

Finlayson did not list the accident truck on his own policy and
pay a premium for it.
As demonstrated above, it is the insured's unauthorized,
temporary, or irregular use of the vehicle that is covered.

The

situtation is comparable to an insured's borrowing a car, or for
that matter, stealing one.

Metropolitan was aware when it issued

the policy that its insured would occasionally operate other cars

-l 1-

for his purposes.

The company included "drive other car"

coverage in the policy both to provide for such anticipated use
and to make its policy more attractive for the insuring public to
buy.

A non-owned automobile's use in connection with non-work

related drinking activities is precisely the type of
unauthorized, temporary or irregular use which the coverage
contemplates.

The FINCO pickup had never been used for such

purposes before, and there is no suggestion that it was ever used
for such purposes again.
20.

Metropolitan finally and once again argues that

this Court failed to consider the policy's "business use"
exclusion.
This point of Metropolitan's Petition for Rehearing has
been addressed above and at pages 3 and 4 of the Court's opinion.
CONCLUSION
The arguments presented in support of Metropolitan's
Petition for Rehearing are, without exception, devoid of merit.
Reopening the appeal or reversing this Court's decision would
encourage the use of ambiguous policy language.

If there is to

be any public policy consideration, it should be to foster
certainty rather than the uncertainty which would be promoted by
ignoring the ambiguity which Metropolitan has created and
allowing it to escape liability.

The company and not the

insuring public should pay for Metropolitan's error in failing to
incorporate a meaningful definition of the ambiguous term it
chose to use.

DATED this

n

day of April, 1988.

Respectfully submitted,

ANTHONY M. THURBER
Attorney for DefendantAppellant Childs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, on
this

y

day of April, 1988, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing to the following:
Lowell V. Smith
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
650 Clark Learning Office Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John M. Chipman
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Neal Finlayson

